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Climate change will increase temperature, precipitation, droughts, storms 
and fires, as well as exacerbate extreme weather events and disasters.1 Such events 
are expected to have a significant and costly impact on property.2 These impacts 
pose an uncertain financial risk to the agricultural industry, more specifically to 
farmers. As a result, farmers are counting on crop insurance to protect their 
investment from increased risks associated with climate change. However, it is 
uncertain whether the current crop insurance scheme in the United States will be 
able to protect farmers’ investments. Many interested parties dispute how the risks 
and costs associated with insurance should be shared. Currently, Congress is 
debating this topic, and many are calling for budget cuts to the scheme. This paper 
focuses on how to reform crop insurance to cope with climate change-induced 
difficulties. This paper argues that to better address climate change, Congress, in 
the 2018 Farm Bill and all subsequent Farm Bills, should phase out premium 
subsidies, as well as administrative and operating payments, to private insurance 
companies. Then Congress should uncap private insurance companies’ profit levels 
and give them more freedom to compete and write their own policies. Under this 
amended scheme, private insurance companies will encourage farmers to 
implement low-risk, environmentally friendly farming practices, because such 
practices will decrease payouts and act as a financial incentive for insurance 
companies. Those more sustainable farming practices, in turn, will help the U.S. 
mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
 
 
  Perry Elerts is a law student at the University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law, class of 2019. Perry dedicates this paper to his sister, Ellie, who makes him want 
to leave the world a better place. 
1. Wuebbles, D. J., et al., Executive Summary, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: 
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I 11-34 (2017), https://perma.cc/97U5-
N9LS. 
2. Id. 
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This paper begins with the history and background of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act and the context that led to its enactment. By reviewing the Dust 
Bowl and Great Depression, it is evident that crop insurance was, and is, needed to 
support farmers, agricultural industries, and agricultural economies.3  
Next this paper will explore how crop insurance plays a vital role in areas 
such as economics, agriculture, trade, and social justice.4 At a glance, the United 
States’ agricultural exports are around $140 billion, while imports are around $90 
billion.5 In 2016, crop insurance covered 1.2 million different policies, spanning 
more than 290 million acres of farmland.6 The importance of these polices extend 
beyond economics; increasing rates of suicide in the farming profession has been 
connected to crop failures, further implicating the need for a functioning crop 
insurance scheme.7 
Third, this paper will look at how crop insurance will be affected by climate 
change.8 Some effects of climate change include the impact on food production. 
Although North America may benefit from a warmer climate and increased carbon 
dioxide; severe weather storms and increased drought will result in significant 
losses in crop yield.9 Additionally, “increases in temperatures coupled with more 
variable precipitation will reduce reproductivity of crops and these effects will 
outweigh the benefits of increasing carbon dioxide.”10 Pests, insects, and weeds 
may also thrive under increasing air temperatures, causing a decrease in crop 
yields.11 Thus, climate change poses numerous problems to the agriculture 
industry: higher temperatures, severe storms, and increasing number of pests, 
 
3. USDA., History of Crop Insurance Program, About Risk Management Agency 
(Oct. 15, 2018, 10:43 PM), https://perma.cc/43H5-YT74. 
4. Id.; Dr. Rajinder S. Aurora et al., Crop Insurance, INT’L J. OF RECENT RESEARCH 
ASPECTS, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 2016. 
5. Charles L. Walthall et al., Climate Change and Agriculture in the United States: 
Effects and Adaptation, in USDA TECHNICAL BULLETIN 1935, at 11. 
6. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Facts & Figures, Crop Insurance 101 
(Oct. 12, 2018, 7:58 PM), https://perma.cc/WHP9-BMQT. 
7. Dr. Rajinder S. Aurora et al., Crop Insurance, INT’L J. OF RECENT RESEARCH 
ASPECTS, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 2016; Charles L. Walthall et al., Climate Change and 
Agriculture in the United States: Effects and Adaptation, in USDA TECHNICAL BULLETIN 
1935, at 32–36. 
8. Wuebbles, D. J., et al., supra note 1. 
9. Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., North America, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014). 
10. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
11. Id. 
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insects, and weeds.12 The effects of climate change on crop insurance demonstrate 
the vulnerabilities of the scheme, and that reforms are necessary for the scheme to 
optimally function.  
Lastly, this paper will discuss ways Congress could utilize the Farm Bill to 
reform crop insurance. The combination of the current political climate and 
proposed reforms discussed, should prompt Congress to enact reform. This paper 
suggests Congress should phase out premium subsidies, as well as administrative 
and operating payments to private insurance companies. Then Congress should 
uncap private insurance company profit levels and give them more freedom to 
develop their own policies. These reforms will help the country adapt to climate 
change and mitigate some of its effects. The reforms will also incentivize private 
companies to lower pay-outs, and offer discounts to farmers who implement low-
risk, environmentally friendly practices. Further, the reduction in subsidies will 
lower the cost to taxpayers. Fewer subsidies allow the market to signal farmers of 
potential risks associated with farming.  
 
II. The Basics and How We Got Here 
 
The farming business is very similar to starting and running any other type 
of business. Farmers typically take out loans from banks or use large portions of 
their savings to begin their farming businesses.13 They spend some initial capital 
on educating themselves about the industry.14 That capital is also used to purchase 
all the required materials and tools, which allows them to continually grow and 
harvest crops.15 Their investments become vested in their crops, making the crops 
an asset to farmers.16 As the crops are grown and harvested, they hopefully yield a 
return on the investment for the farmer.17 Ideally, the yield or return on investment 
becomes enough for the farmer to survive and provide a basic standard of living.18 
Farmers usually spend their return on paying off debt, living expenses, putting 
money into savings, and reinvesting in the next season’s crops.19  
Unfortunately, when natural disasters or market fluctuations hit farmers their 
crop yields are not enough to pay off their initial investment, because their crops 
 
12. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
13. Accion, 10 Ways An Agricultural Loan Can Help Farmers Grow, Business 
Resources (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:18 PM), https://perma.cc/A6ZM-UA8A.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Essential Strengths, Crop Insurance 
101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:19 PM), https://perma.cc/NZ67-KAHS. 
17. USDA., History of Crop Insurance Program, supra note 2. 
18. Id. 
19. Accion, Supra note 13. 
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become devalued due to damage or a change in market prices.20 Consequently, if a 
farmers’ assets fail to actualize, meaning their investments into farming does not 
return a profit or break even, the farmers will incur a financial loss. If farmers do 
not have enough saved, they must default on their loans. They may also not have 
enough capital to replant, which can lead to food shortages.21  
If that nightmare scenario sounds familiar, it is because that is precisely what 
happened during the Dust Bowl and Great Depression.22 A mix of bad farming 
practices and drought led to massive crop failures, and famers did not have enough 
capital to replant.23 This gave way to food shortages and skyrocketed food prices 
across America.24 It became such a problem that Congress had to offer disaster 
relief funding on multiple occasions.25  
However, ad hoc disaster relief funding takes a long time to pass in Congress, 
and dispersing aid can be a timely and burdensome procedure.26 The more recent 
hurricanes in Houston and Puerto Rico demonstrate this problem today.27 Congress 
recognized the need for a quicker, more stable way to support the United States’ 
agriculture industry.28 The Federal Crop Insurance Act was born as a result.29 Crop 
insurance was Congress’ and the agriculture industry’s response to the Dust Bowl 
and the Great Depression.30  
 
III. The Critical Role of Crop Insurance 
 
The purpose of crop insurance is to “promote the national welfare by 
improving the economic stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop 
insurance and providing the means for the research and experience[s] helpful in 
devising and establishing such insurance.”31 Crop insurance also provides farmers 
 
20. USDA., History of Crop Insurance Program, supra note 2. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Kimberly Amadeo, How the Dust Bowl Environmental Disaster Impacted the US 
Economy: The Scary Thing Is That It Could Happen Again, THE BLAZE (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:20 
PM), https://perma.cc/DM6D-SUAH. 
24. Id. 
25. USDA., History of Crop Insurance Program, supra note 2. 
26. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, What is Crop Insurance, Crop 
Insurance 101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://perma.cc/U5TG-KV72.  
27. Jack Healy et al., Aid Is Getting to Puerto Rico. Distributing It Remains a 
Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018, 9:10 PM), https://perma.cc/T556-2EH5.  
28. USDA., History of Crop Insurance Program, supra note 2.  
29. Id. 
30. Id.  
31. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (2014). 
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with the capital and security to stay effective and competitive in world markets.32 
It offers a safety net in cases of natural disasters or market fluctuations.33 Without 
crop insurance, farmers are reliant on disaster relief funding from Congress, which 
takes too long to reach farmers.34 It takes Congress a significant amount of time to 
write and pass a bill and disburse financial relief. By the time money reaches 
farmers it’s too late and farmers have already been forced to shut down or the 
planting season has already gone by.35 With crop insurance, private companies can 
quickly respond to losses and help farmers get back on their feet.36 This helps 
ensure a stable output of food and natural resources from America’s farms.37 
Climate change, however, may be the straw that breaks the net set up to protect 
farmers. 
Crop insurance is vital to the United States because farmers grow food, fiber, 
wheat, and numerous other raw food sources, which provide materials for 
thousands of essential products.38 People around the world depend daily on 
products grown by American farmers.39 Crop insurance has become a cornerstone 
for stability in the agriculture industry, and a healthy farm economy is essential to 
the growth and stability of America’s economy as a whole.40 Agricultural exports 
are around $140 billion and imports are around $90 billion, making agriculture a 
net positive to the U.S. trade balance.41  
In 2016, crop insurance covered more than 290 million acres of farmland.42 
This amounted to around 1.2 million different policies across the country.43 In 
2015, agriculture and related industries contributed $992 billion to U.S. GDP, 
 
32. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Why It Matters, Crop Insurance 101 
(Oct. 12, 2018, 8:26 PM), https://perma.cc/2FB8-PX27. 
33. Id. 
34. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, What is Crop Insurance, Crop 
Insurance 101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://perma.cc/U5TG-KV72. 
35. Id.  
36. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Why is Private Sector Delivery of Crop 
Insurance Important, Crop Insurance 101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:26 PM) https://perma.cc/3PNX-
63H5. 
37. Id. 
38. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Why It Matters, Crop Insurance 101 
(Oct. 12, 2018, 8:26 PM), https://perma.cc/2FB8-PX27.  
39. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4. 
40. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, What is Crop Insurance, Crop 
Insurance 101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://perma.cc/U5TG-KV72. 
41. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 11. 
42. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Facts & Figures, Crop Insurance 101 
(Oct. 12, 2018, 7:58 PM), https://perma.cc/WHP9-BMQT. 
43. Id. 
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around a 5.5% share.44 Participation in crop insurance has continually grown.45 
There are more than 130 different crops covered with an issued value of around 
$100 billion.46 Crop insurance has become such a cornerstone of the economy, that 
it is imperative to America’s prosperity that it continues to serve its purpose. 
 
IV. Social Costs of Crop Insurance 
 
Crop insurance is vital for many other countries as well.47 India is currently 
on their third crop insurance scheme.48 Due to poor implementation and buy-in by 
farmers, previous schemes failed.49 India’s agricultural economy is large—it 
accounts for 14% of its GDP and employs nearly half of its population.50 The 
program has proved vital in India because of India’s vulnerability to droughts, 
floods and monsoons.51 Nearly 55% of cultivated areas in India are dependent on 
the timely arrival of monsoons.52 Since many farmers lack the capital to build 
costly and sophisticated irrigation systems for their crops, they must rely on annual 
rainfall instead.53 
A stunning study out of the University of California, Berkeley highlighted 
India’s need to address crop failures.54 The study attributed more than 59,000 
farmer suicides in India to rising temperatures since 1980.55 The study found a 
correlation between increased temperatures in growing seasons and farmer suicide 
rates.56 Nearly two-thirds of India’s farmers are poor and lack access to constant 
irrigation,57 so they rely on rainfall from monsoons.58 This leaves Indian farmers 
 
44. USDA. Economic Research Service, Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, Ag 
and Food Statistics: Charting the Essentials (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:15 PM), https://perma. 
cc/KGF5-XDQX. 
45. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, What is Crop Insurance, Crop 
Insurance 101 (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://perma.cc/U5TG-KV72. 
46. Id. 
47. Dr. Rajinder S. Aurora et al., supra note 3, at 32–36. 
48. Id. at 32. 
49. Id. 





55. Tamma A. Carleton, Crop-damaging temperatures increase suicide rates in 
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particularly susceptible to droughts and climate change.59 Climate change alters 
monsoon patterns and increases droughts and floods, which reduces crop yields 
and causes crop failures.60 This causes financial hardships for farmers, who are 
often working on razor thin financial margins.61 Facing financial ruin, some 
farmers turn to suicide.62  
The study concludes that climate change accounts for about 7% of the 
increased rate of suicide in India.63 This is one of many studies that calculate the 
true costs and impacts of climate change. It is not enough to only consider the 
effects of climate change on agriculture and crop yield. A well-constructed crop 
insurance scheme should address social justice concerns, including increase suicide 
rates. 
 
V. Climate Change Effects on Agriculture and Crop Insurance 
 
The International Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) states that food 
production in North America may benefit from the warmer climate and increases 
in carbon dioxide, but overall drought increases and severe weather storms will 
result in significant loss in crop yield, meaning less food production.64 The United 
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) reiterates this in their Effects and 
Adaptation report stating that “increases in temperatures coupled with more 
variable precipitation will reduce reproductivity of crops and these effects will 
outweigh the benefits of increasing carbon dioxide.”65 Additionally, the report 
states pests, insects and weeds are likely to thrive under increasing temperatures.66 
Increases and changes in timing of rain and snow mix will also pose challenges to 
managing irrigation systems.67 
Crop yields will be affected by increases in temperatures. All plants have 
minimum, maximum, and optimum temperatures.68 The minimum is the floor 
temperature in which a plant can grow, and the maximum is the highest 
 
59. Tamma A. Carleton, supra note 55. 
60. Tamma A. Carleton, supra note 55. 
61. Dr. Rajinder S. Aurora et al., supra note 3, at 32–36. 
62. Id. 
63. Tamma A. Carleton, supra note 55. 
64. Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., North America, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014). 
65. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 11. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4. 
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temperature in which a plant can grow.69 Each plant species has a different optimal, 
minimum and maximum level. Studies show that temperature increases past the 
optimal growth level can lead to sharp declines in crop yield.70 Some models 
illustrate how increased temperatures will lead to a decline between 2.5% and 10% 
for some agronomic species.71 Other models estimate a decline in yield between 
3.8% and 5%.72 A study cited in the USDA report estimated that declines in wheat, 
corn, and cotton would be between 36% to 40% under a low emissions scenario, 
and a decline from 63% to 70% in a higher emissions scenario.73 These studies do 
not account for the beneficial effects of carbon dioxide, nor the negative effects of 
pests or weeds.74 These studies also failed to consider market adaptations like new 
fertilizers, genetically modified seeds, tillage, or other adaptation methods which 
may be used.75 Still, even slight decreases in crop yields can lead to large payouts 
under the current crop insurance scheme.  
Further, the increase in temperature will affect the dissemination of weeds 
and non-desired plants throughout the United States.76 According to the USDA, the 
most troublesome weeds are constrained to the tropical and subtropical area of the 
Gulf States.77 Warmer temperatures in the Midwest will likely cause these 
aggressive weed species to move northward throughout the United States.78 This 
will likely reduce crop yield and increase payouts for those farmers covered by 
crop insurance.  
An additional component of crop yields is the prevalence of pest species that 
damage crops. Increasing air temperatures will continue to expand many insects’ 
geographical ranges.79 Increases in temperature cause longer growing seasons.80 
Earlier springs allow for longer life cycles for pests and more time for damage to 
crops.81 However, due to increased climate variability, pest population outbreaks 




71. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4. 
72. Id. 
73. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, citing W. Schlenker & M.J. Roberts, 
Nonlinear Temperature Effects Indicate Severe Damages to U.S. Crop Yields Under Climate 
Change, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 15594–15595 (2009). 
74. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 11. 
75. Id. at 6. 
76. Id. at 39. 
77. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 45. 
80. Id. at 36. 
81. Id. at 44. 
82. Id. at 45. 
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the growth of crops, but it will also affect a number of other factors that influence 
agriculture.83  
These impacts will vary regionally, and the ability of farmers to adapt and 
adjust farming practices will lessen the negative effects of climate change.84 A 
farmer’s ability to adapt to climate change will largely depend on market, 
institutional, and governmental policy signals.85 Technological advances in 
irrigation, genetically modified seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides are a few areas that 
may help mitigate the effects of climate change. These advances and adaptation 
measures will help to increase crop yield and lessen crop failures. However, some 
of these adaptation methods may come with their own environmental concerns.  
Climate change’s effects on agriculture threaten the viability of the current 
crop insurance schemes. Crop insurance policies cover damages from pests, severe 
storms, and lower yield levels.86 Climate change is set to increase the costs of 
payouts because it will exacerbate lower crop yields, droughts, floods, temperature 
changes, pests, and weeds.87 Private insurance companies issue payouts when 
farmers have a legitimate claim under their insurance policy. Payouts may increase 
to such a degree that private insurance companies are unable to cover all the losses, 
resulting in the need for the federal government, to once again, step in and issue 
disaster relief funding. The Federal Crop Insurance Act was passed for this very 
reason—to avoid the need for disaster relief funding.88 In these instances, the 
federal government is forced to intervene because failure to do so could destroy 
the United States’ agriculture industry. The agriculture industry may be unable to 
recover on its own, or not recover in time to prevent food and resource shortages. 
Countries will need to adapt, by amending their schemes to better handle increased 
payouts and to incentivize low risk farming practices. A failure to modify crop 
insurance schemes to take climate change’s impacts into account may lead to 
another Dust Bowl or contribute to rising farmer suicide rates. 
 
VI. The United States’ Crop Insurance Scheme 
 
The United States Crop Insurance Scheme is authorized through the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act, often referred to as the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
 
83. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 45. 
84. Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., North America, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1439, 1444 (2014). 
85. Id. 
86. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a)(1) (2014). 
87. Charles L. Walthall et al., supra note 4, at 11. 
88. USDA, History of Crop Insurance Program, supra note 2. 
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(“FCIP”).89 The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (“FCIC”), operated under the 
Risk Management Agency (“RMA”), is a part of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”).90 The RMA is responsible for writing the Multiple Peril 
Crop Insurance (“MPCI”) policies, as well as overseeing and regulating the 
industry.91 The FCIC, as part of its regulatory duties, is tasked with setting crop 
insurance rates.92 MPCI policies typically cover destructive weather, like frost, 
wind, disease, drought, fire, flooding and insect damage.93  
The federal government, in addition to regulating insurance, also subsidizes 
the premiums that farmers pay.94 Farmers pay around 38% of the costs of the 
premium and the government pays the remaining 62%.95 This helps reduce the 
costs borne by farmers and allows more farmers to participate in the program. The 
federal government also reimburses private insurance companies for both the costs 
of operating and administrative costs.96 These costs include things like staff 
salaries, commissions, adjusting losses, trainings, marketing, and a profit 
component.97 The price has averaged around $1.3 billion a year.98 The federal 
government reimburses operating and administrative costs to lower the cost of 
farmers’ policies.99 Further, the federal government reinsures private companies 
for any excess losses.100 This way, in the case of a large disaster, the private 
companies do not go bankrupt and leave farmers without needed payouts on their 
claims. The private insurance companies share in any additional underwriting, 
meaning any excess profit reverts back to the government.101 These subsidies 
illustrate how taxpayers primarily bear the burdens of climate change, because they 
will pay for the additional costs and increased subsidies. 
 
89. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508 (2014). 
90. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (2014). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a)(1) (2014). 
94. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(d) (2014). 
95. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCE SUBSIDES IN THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
(2016), https://perma.cc/8RL9-SD8Z. 
96. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(c)(4)(C)(v)(ii) (2014). 
97. Keith Collins & Frank Schanpp, Explaining the Costs of the Crop Insurance 
Program, CROP INSURANCE TODAY (February 2012), https://perma.cc/Q6LQ-6W8N. 
98. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96.  
99. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Who are Approved Insurance 
Providers (August 2018), https://perma.cc/94UB-ZNPK. 
100. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a)(1) (2014). 
101. Keith Collins & Frank Schanpp, Explaining the Costs of the Crop Insurance 
Program, CROP INSURANCE TODAY (February 2012), https://perma.cc/Q6LQ-6W8N. 
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After an insurance company becomes approved to issue crop insurance, it 
becomes an Approved Insurance Provider (“AIP”).102 Currently there are fifteen 
AIPs.103 They enter into a contract with the FCIC known as the Standard 
Reinsurance Agreement (“SRA”).104 In the contract, the government agrees to 
reinsure them, and the AIP agrees to follow all procedures and processes 
established by the FCIC for issuing crop insurance.105 The AIPs are responsible for 
writing and reinsuring the policies, marketing, adjusting and processing claims, 
training, and record keeping.106 The premium rates and insurance terms are set by 
the FCIC, and uniform throughout the industry, making these rates non-
competitive.107 Thus, the premiums and rates farmers pay for coverage will be the 
same, regardless of the company that insures them.108 This leaves the private 
companies to compete based on their insurance knowledge, marketing, customer 
service, and other related products.109  
With all the subsidies given to private companies, and the government setting 
noncompetitive rates, it raises the question of whether the scheme should be 
nationalized.  The government contends that private insurance companies are 
needed because of the importance of the implementation of the crop insurance 
scheme.110 The federal government lacks the manpower and resources to issue 
policies across the United States.111 As noted, the major problem in India has been 
implementation.112 In India it is difficult reaching rural farmers and convincing 
them to buy insurance.113 The inclusion of private insurance companies also allows 




102. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Who are Approved Insurance 
Providers (August 2018), https://perma.cc/F8BL-KA3A. 
103. Id. 
104. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Who are Approved Insurance 
Providers (August 2018), https://perma.cc/F8BL-KA3A. 
105. Id. 




110. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Why is Private Sector Delivery of 
Crop Insurance Important, https://perma.cc/7AMC-SVCP. 
111. Id. 
112. Chandra Bhushan & Vineet Kumar, Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana: An 
Assessment ( 2017), at 15. 
113. Id. 
114. Crop Insurance Keeps America Growing, Why is Private Sector Delivery of 
Crop Insurance Important, https://perma.cc/7AMC-SVCP. 
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VII: Possible Reforms to Crop Insurance 
 
A. The Farm Bill as the Vehicle for Reform 
 
The Farm Bill is a multi-year piece of legislation enacted by Congress which 
governs: commodity programs, conservation, trade, nutrition, credit, rural 
development, research, forestry, energy, horticulture and organic agriculture, and 
crop insurance.115 The most recent Farm Bill, also referred to as the Agricultural 
Act, was introduced in 2014.116 It is set to expire in 2018.117 The Farm Bill is 
renewed about every five years, allowing policymakers, Congress, and other 
interested parties, the chance to revisit and address issues involving food and 
agriculture.118 Therefore, now is the perfect time to discuss issues around crop 
insurance and possible reforms. Congress needs to address these issues now or 
another five years may pass before they are resolved. With the United States 
already feeling the effects of climate change on agriculture, there is an urgency to 
address these issues.119 
When Congress last amended the Farm Bill in 2014 it weakened the system 
and placed more strain on taxpayers in two key ways.120 First, Congress added a 
beginning farmer provision, which waives a $300 administrative fee, and increases 
premium subsidies by 10%.121 This move was questionable, because beginning 
farmers are less likely to be experienced and educated than more experienced or 
seasoned farmers, therefore making them riskier to insure. This would place a 
larger burden on taxpayers, and give incorrect market signals to first time farmers.  
Second, Congress added a provision known as the Actual Production History 
(“APH”) Yield Exclusion (“YE”).122 This provision allows producers to exclude 
exceptionally poor yield years from their production history.123 The provision alters 
their average historical yields and production history, which is how the RMA 
calculates crop insurance coverage rates.124 Thus, the government—in an effort to 
keep costs low—is allowing farmers and the RMA to ignore risks or pretend that 
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certain risks don’t exist. This allows natural disasters to be ignored, and the risks 
to be disregarded in later calculating insurance rates. 
On the other hand, Congress did appear to strengthen the FCIP in other 
provisions. The Whole-Farm Revenue Protection (“WFRP”) Policy was added to 
help insure diverse farming operations.125 This permits all the crops that farmers 
are growing are insured, allowing farmers to practice altering crop rows and 
increase diversity on their land.126 Congress also added the Stacked Income 
Protection Program (“STAX”), which was specifically tailored to insuring 
cotton.127 A Conservation Compliance provision was also added, which requires 
farmers to file a Highly Erodible Land Conservation and Wetlands Conservation 
Certification form, in order to remain eligible for crop insurance.128 The form 
requires farmers to have a conservation plan, which helps manage and control 
erosion, and prohibits farmers from converting wetlands into farmland.129 Congress 
also cut benefits to farmers who plant on native sod.130  
After seeing the previous administration’s crop insurance reforms, all eyes 
are on the Trump administration and how it will react (keep in mind, it was the 
country farmers in the Midwest who provided the backbone of support for Trump’s 
presidency). In President Trump’s proposed budget he called for a 36% cut in 
subsidies to crop insurance over the coming decade.131 President Trump also 
mentioned capping subsidies per person to a total of $40,000 a year, and denying 
subsidies to people with an adjusted gross income above $500,000 a year.132 These 
caps would eliminate premium subsidies to the biggest and wealthiest farmers.133 
It seems these cuts are needed to balance the budget and pay for military spending 
and tax reform.134 Although the current administration has commented on crop 
insurance reform, if any changes are to take place it would not be as a result of the 
recognition of climate change, given the current administration fails to recognize 
climate change. 
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B. Proposed Reforms to Crop Insurance to Better Address Climate 
Change 
 
There are many suggestions on how crop insurance can be reformed to better 
address costs and climate change.135 In 2014, the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) issued a report, which called for the USDA to promote the 
incorporation of resilient agricultural practices into their expert guidance reports.136 
This would allow for implementation of agricultural practices, which mitigate the 
effects of climate change and promote resilience in the industry.137 This practice, 
if adopted by farmers, would help mitigate climate change, thus lessening its 
effects on the industry.138  
The USDA later issued the Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture 
and Forestry: Implementation Plan and Progress Report.139 This report outlined 
ten building blocks designed to help farmers reduce greenhouse emissions and set 
goals for improving resilience to climate change.140 However, as the GAO points 
out, the USDA report is based on voluntary actions, making it unclear if crop 
insurance policyholders will actually implement these measures to improve 
resilience.141  
Critics suggest that the USDA should incorporate their Building Blocks 
Report into the “good farming practices requirement,” instead of making the 
resilience measures voluntary.142 The Federal Crop Insurance Act states that crop 
insurance will not apply to losses due to “the failure of the producer to follow good 
farming practices.”143 Good farming practices are defined as: 
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The production methods utilized to produce the insured crop and allow 
it to make normal progress toward maturity and produce at least the 
yield used to determine the production guarantee or amount of 
insurance, including any adjustments for late planted acreage, which 
are: (1) For conventional or sustainable farming practices, those 
generally recognized by agricultural experts for the area; or (2) For 
organic farming practices, those generally recognized by organic 
agricultural experts for the area or contained in the organic plan. We 
may, or you may request us to, contact FCIC to determine whether or 
not production methods will be considered to be good farming 
practices.144 
 
Thus, farmers are financially motivated to use “good farming practices,” in 
order to be successful in any claims under their crop insurance policy.145 The RMA 
further defined the good farming practice standard in the Good Farming Practices 
Determination Standards Handbook (“Handbook”).146 The main factors for 
assessing good farming practices are the, (1) agronomic situation of the policy 
holder, including: (a) material facts about the production methods that were used 
or will be used to produce the crop; (b) weather and climate factors; (c) pest or 
disease risks; and (d) other factors affecting the crop and (2) expert opinions from 
at least one agricultural expert.147  
However, the good “farming practice standard” has received much 
criticism.148 The GAO has called on the USDA to promote the incorporation of 
resilient agriculture to mitigate climate change risks.149 An example cited by 
Marzen and Ballard illustrates how the “good farming practice standard” has failed 
to mitigate climate change risks. They cite the “case of an insured crop producer 
who was awarded a Natural Resources Conservation Service Conservation 
Innovation Grant for his work with cover crops on his farm, but was later denied 
crop insurance coverage by the RMA, based on a “good farming practices” 
determination and allegations that his cover crops violated the RMA 
“interplanting” regulations.”150 This illustrates the rigidity of the “good farming 
practice standard,” and its failure to allow for innovation, environmentally friendly, 
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and resilient management practices.151 Marzen and Ballard suggest amending the 
“good farming practice standard” and Handbook to include an additional factor.152 
The additional factor would allow policyholders that use sustainable, resilient, or 
soil building practices, to count them toward a determination of good farming 
practices.153 
Further, Natural Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) critiques crop 
insurance because it “has become a crutch on which farmers will increasingly be 
forced to lean on while taxpayers pick up the ever-growing bill.”154 Under the 
FCIP, insurance companies may propose to the RMA “pilot programs” which 
reduce premium rates below those set with the loss cost formula.155 NRDC 
proposed its own pilot program addressing two major areas of concern, the current 
premium rates attract high-risk producers and the program incentives encourage 
harmful farming practices which damage natural resources and increase risk of 
crop loss.156  
Regarding premium rates, NRDC argues that because loss cost ratemaking 
depends on historical yield and indemnities, any quick change in one factor results 
in inaccurate ratemaking and unfair premiums.157 Relying on historical data is even 
more problematic because climate change is changing current climates, making 
historical yield and indemnities less reliable for assessing future risk.158 For 
example, if crop yields increase in an area due to warmer temperatures and the loss 
cost ratemaking has yet to reflect that, then the farmer would be overpaying in 
premiums. Conversely, if a troublesome weed species is now present in an area 
because of temperature changes and increasing indemnities, the farmer may be 
underpaying in premiums. This risk analysis attracts high-risk farmers and 




152. Chad G. Marzen & J. Grant Ballard, supra note 148.  
153. Id. 
154. Claire O’Connor, Natural Resource Defense Council, Soil matters: How the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program Should be Reformed to Encourage Low-risk Farming 
Methods with High-reward Environmental Outcome (August 2013), https://perma.cc/ 
Y9XP-86AT.  
155. 7 USCA § 1523 (2018). 
156. Claire O’Connor, supra note 160. 
157. Id. 
158. Maffie Koerth-Baker, Mutually Insured Destruction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 
2013), https://perma.cc/GJ7J-GNNB.  
159. Claire O’Connor, supra note 160. 
160. Id. 
7_ELERTS_FINAL3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  1:23 PM 




NRDC also criticizes the program for incentivizing harmful farming 
practices, which damage natural resources and increase risk of crop loss.161 The 
RMA sets noncompetitive rates which does not allow the insurance companies to 
send market signals to farmers.162 This means private insurance companies are 
unable to require mitigation, or risk reduction techniques. This is contrary to how 
insurance companies typically work. Insurance companies increasingly push for 
policies that reduce risks.163 For example, companies offer discounts for 
homeowner policyholders who have fire alarms installed and discounts for car 
insurance policy holders who have a safe driving record.164 These noncompetitive 
rates encourage high-risk farmers, because they are able to pay disproportionately 
lower premiums.165 Due to set prices, high-risk farmers pay significantly lower 
than what their actual rates would be otherwise. Conversely, low-risk farmers are 
discouraged from using environmentally friendly, risk-reducing management 
techniques, because they would pay disproportionately higher premiums.166 For 
example, with fixed rates, a farmer who uses cover crops and is a low risk will have 
a set premium, which does not reflect the actual risk to the farm. 
NRDC’s pilot program offers a solution for the problems it perceives. For a 
pilot program to be adopted by the RMA it must meet several factors.167 It must 
produce actuarially sound premium rate reductions, be in the best interest of 
producers, avoid unfair discrimination among farmers, be offered in adequate 
geographic areas, have expansion potential, and meet all technical and procedural 
requirements.168 NRDC believes their program meets all those factors.169 The pilot 
program is based on giving premium reductions to farmers who use risk-reducing 
management practices.170 For example, NRDC cites a study, which reports that in 
2010 corn farmers who used no-till (a type of soil-building farming management 
practice), were 30% less likely to receive an indemnity payment under the FCIP.171 
If all farmers had adopted this method, $224 million in indemnities could have 
been saved.172 Additionally, large savings could occur by incentivizing farmers to 
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use cover crops and efficient irrigation farming practices.173 In 2012, irrigation 
supply failures accounted for more than $14.7 million in indemnity payouts.174 
NRDC argues that by lowering premiums for farmers who take risk reduction 
measures farmers will be incentivized to adopt more environmentally friendly, low 
risk, practices.175 These practices would make farms more resilient to climate 
change and natural disasters, and lower indemnity payments.176 Additionally, 
lowered premiums would pay for themselves, because the decrease in indemnity 
payouts would be more than the reduction in premiums.177 NRDC believes this 
pilot program is a “holistic view of risk management [and] would be good for 
farmers, good for taxpayers, and good for the environment.”178 
NRDC, together with the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land 
Stewardship (“IDALS”), and other groups, have launched a similar pilot 
program.179 The program will give farmers who plant cover crops a $5 discount per 
acre on their crop insurance over the next three years.180 Only 1.5% of Iowa farmers 
currently use cover crops because it can be costly, but 80% are insured through the 
FCIP.181 Hopefully, the discount will be an incentive for farmers to implement 
cover crops. The use of cover crops will help promote soil health and reduce runoff 
from agriculture.182 If adopted, this practice can help the country mitigate climate 
change effects on soil erosion and soil health, reduce risks of crop failure, and may 
help farmers adapt to changes in climate as a result of having healthier soil.183 
A critique of NRDC’s plan is that it goes against the current political climate 
by calling for increased taxpayer subsidies.184 However, in the long run, it appears 
to be beneficial and financially sound.185 Alternatively this paper suggests, rather 
than having the government raise subsidies, the private insurance industry could 
offer a very similar program. Amending the FCIP and allowing for competitive 
rates would solve the disproportional impact of farmers paying more, despite their 
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should compete with one another and offer policies tailored to the risk level of 
particular farmers. These private competitive policies would encourage farmers to 
implement good farming practices because their risk level will be better reflected 
in their premiums.  
 
VIII: Lifting the Restraints on the Private Insurance Market 
 
The government needs to subsidize crop insurance to keep prices low so 
farmers buy in. If they don’t, and disaster strikes, Congress will be forced to bail 
out farmers and offer ad hoc disaster relief.186 Agriculture is too vital to the 
economy, jobs, and politics to have the industry suffer. However, the prices of 
subsidies are becoming too high, and there has been a push by President Trump 
and others to use that money in other areas.187 Regardless, many environmentalist 
solutions target increased subsidies and incentives for farmers who use low-risk 
and environmentally friendly practices.188 
Howard Kunreuther suggests two principles for why insurers do not promote 
coverage.189 These principles are, uncertainty of risk and fear over severe financial 
cost of catastrophic disaster during widespread coverage.190 To the first point, 
climate change is adding uncertainty and risk to insurance modeling; and some are 
calling for a “paradigm shift” in the way insurers calculate risks.191 Typically, 
modeling has been based on historical data, but climate change makes much of that 
data an unreliable predictor.192 However, companies are adapting to stay in 
business and more money is being placed in climate research and risk modeling.193 
To the second point, many insurers of crop insurance share this fear, which is why 
the federal government reinsures private companies. The fear that one drought can 
cause catastrophic damage for a wide range of policy holders is one reason why 
companies either pull out of offering coverage or set unaffordable prices. This 
highlights the need for supporting private insurance companies in case of a large-
scale disaster. Possible solutions include reinsurance by other companies or the 
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government, or a fund that is set-aside for insurance companies in cases of extreme 
loss. This paper suggests fears may dissipate if the FCIP is amended to uncap the 
profit level of private companies. This way, insurers could accumulate enough 
profit to handle large payouts and in the case of a disaster still issue indemnities 
with help from built-up profit reserves.  
Further, crop insurance is not sui generis194 and similar discussions are 
occurring regarding flood insurance and possible reforms to the National Flood 
Insurance Program.195 Flood insurance presents growth opportunities, an expansive 
market, and profit potential for private insurers.196 However, a 2014 report by the 
GAO noted that private insurers are not likely to write flood insurance without the 
freedom to charge adequate, risk-based premiums.197 The report suggested a way 
to balance these concerns—allow private insurance companies to offer risk-based 
premiums and the government to offer a voucher-based program to those unable to 
afford the insurance.198 Crop insurance also offers private companies an expansive 
market with large potential gains.199 If the FCIP was amended, private companies 
could write their own policies and if policies were too expensive the government 
could offer vouchers. This may be less expensive than subsidizing premiums. 
Additionally, insurance companies have been known to encourage safe 
behavior in order to minimize their payouts.200 They do this by offering discounts 
to risk-reducing policyholders, encouraging policyholders to take precautionary 
measures and lobbying Congress to pass meaningful legislation.201 Examples of 
insurance companies encouraging safe behavior include: building codes, smoke 
detectors, seat belts, and safer work place environments.202 Based on the role of 
insurance companies throughout history, if they were allowed to write their own 
policies they would likely incentivize low-risk farming, which is exactly what 
NRDC wants. In this regard, it seems environmentalists and private insurers could 
team up to promote low-risks practices, which could lower prices for farmers and 
benefit the planet. 
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As the GAO noted, private insurers are not likely to write flood insurance 
without the freedom to charge adequate, risk-based premiums.203 Doing this would 
shift the burden of the risk back onto the farmers and private insurers. Without 
subsidies, the taxpayers would no longer be paying for, or carrying the risks that 
come with, crop insurance. This seems like the better allocation of risks, because 
it reflects the risk onto those actually involved in the risky activity. Having the 
taxpayers burdened with around 63% of the costs, the risk is too far removed and 
won’t send any market signals.204 By having farmers front the full costs of 
insurance, they will be encouraged to take risk-reducing measures to get discounts 
from competing private companies. It is very possible that the additional costs to 
farmers get passed onto consumers in the form of higher food prices. But, 
hypothetically, the consumers would have more money in their pockets from not 
subsidizing the insurance in the first place. So, either way, the average American 
will pay for crop insurance through either food prices or taxes. The later seems 
preferable because increased food prices are not necessarily the result, if insurance 
prices stay low. Plus, if farmers are more in tune with market signals they will be 




To better address climate change in the 2018 Farm Bill, and subsequent Farm 
Bills,  Congress should phase out premium subsidies, as well as administrative and 
operating payments to private insurance companies. Under the current subsidy 
structure, taxpayers are, and will continue to be, burdened with increased 
payouts.205 Shifting the financial burden away from farmers takes away policy and 
market signals from farmers.206 Burdening farmers with the true costs of insurance 
will incentivize them to take risk mitigation measures. By continually reinsuring 
the private companies, the government will still be there in case private companies 
are unable to issue payouts. This method will help stabilize the market in dire 
circumstances and remove the need for disaster relief funding. This plan also 
follows the current political climate, which seeks to lessen the deficit and make 
budget cuts to the program. 
 Congress should also uncap profit levels of private insurance companies to 
give them more freedom to compete and write their own policies. Allowing the 
free market to tackle the challenges of crop insurance will ease the risks and costs 
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carried by the taxpayers.207 The uncapped profit levels will also lessen the need for 
reinsurance. Allowing companies to compete will drive down prices and help 
ensure affordability and farmer buy-in. Insurance companies will have a financial 
incentive to decrease payouts, in hopes of increasing their own profits. To do that, 
insurance companies will encourage farmers to take risk-reduction measures. 
These measures are typically environmentally friendly, like soil building 
practices.208 Allowing insurance companies to offer their own policies will provide 
more flexibility and room for innovation. Farmers will be incentivized to show 
insurance companies practices that reduce risk, which should lead to lower 
premiums. Companies will also encourage these practices to decrease the odds of 
a payout. When private companies encourage farmers to implement low-risk, 
environmentally friendly practices, the United States will be in a position where 
the private sector is helping the country mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
 
 
207. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 211. 
208. Claire O’Connor, supra note 160. 
